01 February 2025
IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGEMENT / 宪法法院的判决之影响
August 17, 2021
1.
This Summary serves to update the TCA and wider Chinese South African community on the implications, for our pending hate speech case, of the Constitutional Court’s judgment delivered on Friday, 30 July 2021, in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission and Another (with the Nelson Mandela Foundation and others as amici curiae (friends of the court)).
宪法法院于 2021 年 7 月 30 日, 星期五, 就 Qwelane诉南非人权委员会和其他人（与纳尔逊曼德拉基金会和其他人(法庭之友)）一案中作出的判决摘要用于南非杜省中华公会（TCA）和更广泛的南非华人社团在悬而未决的仇恨言论案件上做更新.
2.
The Community will recall that, in the final days of our trial in late 2019, the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) in the Qwelane case declared section 10(1) (the hate speech provision) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (“Equality Act”) unconstitutional. That section originally read as follows (in the relevant part):
“no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to—
(a) be hurtful;
(b) be harmful or to incite harm;
(c) promote or propagate hatred.”
社团可想起最高上诉法院（“SCA”）在2019年年底的最后几天的审判, 就Qwelane一案, 宣布《促进平等和防止不公平歧视法》（“平等法”）第 10(1) 条（仇恨言论条款）违宪. 当时该部分原文如下（相关部分）：
“任何人不得发表、传播、基于一个或多个被禁止的理由提倡或传达词语，针对任何人，可以合理地解释为表明有明确的意图 –
(a) 是有害的；
(b) 有害或煽动伤害；
(c) 宣扬或传播仇恨。”
3.
The SCA replaced this with: “No person may advocate hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion or sexual orientation and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”
最高上诉法院(SCA)其替换为：“任何人不得宣扬基于种族、民族、性别、宗教或性取向的仇恨并更加构成煽动造成伤害之行为”.
4.
This was a considerably narrower definition of hate speech than the original, and the SCA also made a number of pronouncements that would make it harder to succeed with hate speech complaints (for example, suggesting that the subjective intention to commit hate speech was required). Also, the SCA order implied that any hate speech complaints instituted before its judgment would not be allowed to succeed (as section 10 was being declared unconstitutional retrospectively).
此仇恨言论的定义比原文的定义要窄得多，最高上诉法院(SCA) 更加了一些令人难以以仇恨言论投诉之声明（例如, 暗示发表仇恨言论的主观意图是有必需的）. 此外，SCA的法令更暗示, 在其案判决前任何所提出的仇恨言论之投诉都不许取得成功的判决（因第 10 条法令被追溯性地宣布为违宪之原因）.
5.
The SCA’s judgment meant that strategically the TCA’s case had to be put on hold. Although the TCA’s complaint is not confined to hate speech (section 10), as it also concerns unfair racial discrimination (section 7) and harassment (section 11) – hate speech (section 10) is an important part of our case, and thus the matter could not be argued until the Constitutional Court had pronounced on the constitutionality of section 10.
最高上诉法院(SCA)的判决意味着南非杜省中华公会（TCA）的案件必须战略性地搁置. 虽然南非杜省中华公会（TCA）的投诉不限于仇恨言论的（第10条）, 它还涉及不公平的种族歧视（第7条）和骚扰（第11条） – 但仇恨言论（第10条）是我们案件中重要的组成部分, 因此, 在宪法法院对第10条的宪法发言前我方是无法继续争辩的.
6.
After frustrating and unexplained delays, the Constitutional Court finally, on Friday, 30 July 2021, handed down judgment in which it largely overturned the SCA’s judgment. The Constitutional Court has preserved the original section 10(1) of the Equality Act, except that it has taken out paragraph (a) (believing it to be redundant) and making paragraphs (b) and (c) “conjunctive” or cumulative requirements. The section now reads as follows:
“no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words that are based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to be harmful or to incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred.”
在令人沮丧和无法解释的延误之后, 宪法法院终于在2021年7月30日, 上周五, 作出了判决, 并大程度的推翻了最高上诉法院(SCA) 的判决. 宪法法院保留了平等法的第10（1）段，除了取出（a）（因认为它是多余的）并制定（B）和（C）段落为“联合”或累积要求的. 此部分阅读如下：
“没有人可以基于一个或多个被禁止的理由提倡或对任何人传达发布, 传播, 倡导或传达可以合理解释为暗示打击或煽动危害和促进或传播仇恨.“
7.
Importantly, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the test for hate speech is objective, meaning that the actual subjective intention of the speaker is irrelevant. Hate speech will be found if the reasonable observer would understand the speech as demonstrating a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm, and to promote or propagate hatred. This means, for example, in Mr Horne’s case (the 4th Respondent that appeared in Court), that his testimony about his subjective intention is unhelpful to him – all that matters is what the reasonable observer would have understood as being intended by the words “wipe them out” (i.e. that “them” meant “the Chinese”).
重要的是,宪法法院确认仇恨言论的测试是为客观的, 意思是, 评论者的实际主流意图是无关紧要的. 如果理性的观察者将言论理解为明确的有害或煽动伤害意图, 则将被认定为仇恨言论及宣扬或传播仇恨. 这意味着, 例如Horne 先生在案件中（出庭的第四名被告）, 他个人主观意图的证词对他是没有帮助的 – 重要的是理性的观察者会理解“ 消灭他们”（即“他们”的意思是“华人”）.
8.
The Court crucially also confirmed that there is no requirement to show that anybody acted on the hate speech to commit violent acts against the targeted group (as counsel for the 4th and 8th Respondents seemed to suggest during cross-examination of our witnesses). The speech is judged on its own contents and context. It does not matter what happened or did not happen afterwards. Even “incitement” to commit violence or other hateful acts is not required.
法院还关键地确认不需证明任何人根据仇恨言论针对目标群体实施暴力行为（正如第 4 和第 8 被告的律师对我方的证人进行盘问时似乎所建议的说法）. 言论是根据自身的内容和上下文来做判断的. 发生或未发生都为无关紧要的,甚至也不需要“煽动” 实施暴力或其他仇恨行为.
9.
The Court defined “harmful” as causing deep emotional or psychological pain, or seriously impairing dignity, and “to incite harm” as to incite “discrimination, hostility or violence”. The Court then defined “hatred” as “detestation and vilification” or regarding a group as “to be despised, scorned, denied respect and made subject to ill-treatment”. Elsewhere, the Court found that speech will constitute hate speech if it “undermines the target group’s dignity, social standing and assurance against exclusion, hostility, discrimination and violence”.
法院定义 “有害”, 为造成深刻的情绪或心理痛苦, 或严重损害尊严, “煽动危害”, 煽动“歧视, 敌意或暴力”. 法院然后又将“仇恨” 定义为“憎恨和诽谤” 或 “鄙视、蔑视、拒绝尊重和虐待” 群体. 在其它方面, 法院认定, 如果出现以下, “损害目标群体的尊严, 社会地位和不被排除的保证, 有敌意, 歧视和暴力 ” 那么言论将构成仇恨言论.
10.
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court’s judgment favours TCA’s case, and has finally allowed the case to proceed to finality.
因此, 宪法法院的判决对南非杜省中华公会（TCA）的案例终于允许我方的案件进行至结案.
No event found!
1.
This Summary serves to update the TCA and wider Chinese South African community on the implications, for our pending hate speech case, of the Constitutional Court’s judgment delivered on Friday, 30 July 2021, in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission and Another (with the Nelson Mandela Foundation and others as amici curiae (friends of the court)).
宪法法院于 2021 年 7 月 30 日, 星期五, 就 Qwelane诉南非人权委员会和其他人（与纳尔逊曼德拉基金会和其他人(法庭之友)）一案中作出的判决摘要用于南非杜省中华公会（TCA）和更广泛的南非华人社团在悬而未决的仇恨言论案件上做更新.
2.
The Community will recall that, in the final days of our trial in late 2019, the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) in the Qwelane case declared section 10(1) (the hate speech provision) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (“Equality Act”) unconstitutional. That section originally read as follows (in the relevant part):
“no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to—
(a) be hurtful;
(b) be harmful or to incite harm;
(c) promote or propagate hatred.”
社团可想起最高上诉法院（“SCA”）在2019年年底的最后几天的审判, 就Qwelane一案, 宣布《促进平等和防止不公平歧视法》（“平等法”）第 10(1) 条（仇恨言论条款）违宪. 当时该部分原文如下（相关部分）：
“任何人不得发表、传播、基于一个或多个被禁止的理由提倡或传达词语，针对任何人，可以合理地解释为表明有明确的意图 –
(a) 是有害的；
(b) 有害或煽动伤害；
(c) 宣扬或传播仇恨。”
3.
The SCA replaced this with: “No person may advocate hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion or sexual orientation and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”
最高上诉法院(SCA)其替换为：“任何人不得宣扬基于种族、民族、性别、宗教或性取向的仇恨并更加构成煽动造成伤害之行为”.
4.
This was a considerably narrower definition of hate speech than the original, and the SCA also made a number of pronouncements that would make it harder to succeed with hate speech complaints (for example, suggesting that the subjective intention to commit hate speech was required). Also, the SCA order implied that any hate speech complaints instituted before its judgment would not be allowed to succeed (as section 10 was being declared unconstitutional retrospectively).
此仇恨言论的定义比原文的定义要窄得多，最高上诉法院(SCA) 更加了一些令人难以以仇恨言论投诉之声明（例如, 暗示发表仇恨言论的主观意图是有必需的）. 此外，SCA的法令更暗示, 在其案判决前任何所提出的仇恨言论之投诉都不许取得成功的判决（因第 10 条法令被追溯性地宣布为违宪之原因）.
5.
The SCA’s judgment meant that strategically the TCA’s case had to be put on hold. Although the TCA’s complaint is not confined to hate speech (section 10), as it also concerns unfair racial discrimination (section 7) and harassment (section 11) – hate speech (section 10) is an important part of our case, and thus the matter could not be argued until the Constitutional Court had pronounced on the constitutionality of section 10.
最高上诉法院(SCA)的判决意味着南非杜省中华公会（TCA）的案件必须战略性地搁置. 虽然南非杜省中华公会（TCA）的投诉不限于仇恨言论的（第10条）, 它还涉及不公平的种族歧视（第7条）和骚扰（第11条） – 但仇恨言论（第10条）是我们案件中重要的组成部分, 因此, 在宪法法院对第10条的宪法发言前我方是无法继续争辩的.
6.
After frustrating and unexplained delays, the Constitutional Court finally, on Friday, 30 July 2021, handed down judgment in which it largely overturned the SCA’s judgment. The Constitutional Court has preserved the original section 10(1) of the Equality Act, except that it has taken out paragraph (a) (believing it to be redundant) and making paragraphs (b) and (c) “conjunctive” or cumulative requirements. The section now reads as follows:
“no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words that are based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to be harmful or to incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred.”
在令人沮丧和无法解释的延误之后, 宪法法院终于在2021年7月30日, 上周五, 作出了判决, 并大程度的推翻了最高上诉法院(SCA) 的判决. 宪法法院保留了平等法的第10（1）段，除了取出（a）（因认为它是多余的）并制定（B）和（C）段落为“联合”或累积要求的. 此部分阅读如下：
“没有人可以基于一个或多个被禁止的理由提倡或对任何人传达发布, 传播, 倡导或传达可以合理解释为暗示打击或煽动危害和促进或传播仇恨.“
7.
Importantly, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the test for hate speech is objective, meaning that the actual subjective intention of the speaker is irrelevant. Hate speech will be found if the reasonable observer would understand the speech as demonstrating a clear intention to be harmful or incite harm, and to promote or propagate hatred. This means, for example, in Mr Horne’s case (the 4th Respondent that appeared in Court), that his testimony about his subjective intention is unhelpful to him – all that matters is what the reasonable observer would have understood as being intended by the words “wipe them out” (i.e. that “them” meant “the Chinese”).
重要的是,宪法法院确认仇恨言论的测试是为客观的, 意思是, 评论者的实际主流意图是无关紧要的. 如果理性的观察者将言论理解为明确的有害或煽动伤害意图, 则将被认定为仇恨言论及宣扬或传播仇恨. 这意味着, 例如Horne 先生在案件中（出庭的第四名被告）, 他个人主观意图的证词对他是没有帮助的 – 重要的是理性的观察者会理解“ 消灭他们”（即“他们”的意思是“华人”）.
8.
The Court crucially also confirmed that there is no requirement to show that anybody acted on the hate speech to commit violent acts against the targeted group (as counsel for the 4th and 8th Respondents seemed to suggest during cross-examination of our witnesses). The speech is judged on its own contents and context. It does not matter what happened or did not happen afterwards. Even “incitement” to commit violence or other hateful acts is not required.
法院还关键地确认不需证明任何人根据仇恨言论针对目标群体实施暴力行为（正如第 4 和第 8 被告的律师对我方的证人进行盘问时似乎所建议的说法）. 言论是根据自身的内容和上下文来做判断的. 发生或未发生都为无关紧要的,甚至也不需要“煽动” 实施暴力或其他仇恨行为.
9.
The Court defined “harmful” as causing deep emotional or psychological pain, or seriously impairing dignity, and “to incite harm” as to incite “discrimination, hostility or violence”. The Court then defined “hatred” as “detestation and vilification” or regarding a group as “to be despised, scorned, denied respect and made subject to ill-treatment”. Elsewhere, the Court found that speech will constitute hate speech if it “undermines the target group’s dignity, social standing and assurance against exclusion, hostility, discrimination and violence”.
法院定义 “有害”, 为造成深刻的情绪或心理痛苦, 或严重损害尊严, “煽动危害”, 煽动“歧视, 敌意或暴力”. 法院然后又将“仇恨” 定义为“憎恨和诽谤” 或 “鄙视、蔑视、拒绝尊重和虐待” 群体. 在其它方面, 法院认定, 如果出现以下, “损害目标群体的尊严, 社会地位和不被排除的保证, 有敌意, 歧视和暴力 ” 那么言论将构成仇恨言论.
10.
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court’s judgment favours TCA’s case, and has finally allowed the case to proceed to finality.
因此, 宪法法院的判决对南非杜省中华公会（TCA）的案例终于允许我方的案件进行至结案.